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FURTHER COMMENT ON
PEOPLE v. BELOUS*
R ECENTLY, THE CATHOLIC LAWYER' published an amicus
curiae brief which had been submitted to the Supreme Court of
California in the case of People v. Belous.2 That brief propounded vari-
ous arguments as to why the abortion statute under attack should be
upheld. Subsequent to that publication, the court held the statute in ques-
tion to be unconstitutionally vague. This note will briefly summarize
the Supreme Court decision and introduce the reader to three recent
developments: namely, an unsuccessful petition for reargument pre-
sented by the proponents of the abortion statute, an attack on the
constitutionality of New York's abortion laws, and a recent district
court decision which adopted the holding in Belous.
The Belous Case
The appellant in Belous, Dr. Leon Belous, had been convicted of
conspiracy to commit abortion and abortion. His conviction was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals for the Second District. On appeal to Califor-
nia's highest court, Dr. Belous challenged the constitutionality of the
statutes proscribing abortion as criminal under certain circumstances.
Focusing on the section which prohibited anyone from assisting a
woman in the procurement of a miscarriage with intent to cause such,
*This paper was prepared by the St. Thomas More Institute for Legal Research.
IAbortion Legislation and the Establishment Clause, 15 CATH. LAW. 108 (1969).
2 71 A.C. 996, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969) (en banc).
3 CAL. PEN. CODE § 274 (West 1955) states:
Every person who provides, supplies, or administers to any woman, or
procures any woman to take any medicine, drug, or substance, or uses or
employs any instrument or other means whatever, with intent thereby to
procure the miscarriage of such woman, unless the same is necessary to
preserve her life, is punishable by imprisonment in the State prison not less
than two nor more than five years.
The statute now exists as amended in 1967, providing exceptions to the
absolute prohibition of abortion as prescribed in Cal. Health and Safety Code
§§ 25950-54 (West 1969).
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the Supreme Court of California ruled that
the exception contained in the phrase
"unless the same is necessary to preserve
her life" was not susceptible to a construc-
tion which satisfied due process require-
ments without infringing on fundamental
constitutional rights. 4
In reaching its decision, the court, in an
effort to attain that degree of certainty and
univocity required of criminal legislation, 5
considered the definitions of "necessary"
and "preserve" as cognizable in ordinary
usage, previous judicial decisions, and at
common law. The court concluded, how-
ever, that such a definitional approach was
futile inasmuch as the words are flexible
and relative terms, incapable of singular
import. Nor could a suitable definition be
derived from the common law, since there,
abortion before quickening was not a
crime. '
The court next examined the respon-
dent's contention that the phrase in ques-
tion meant "unless performed the patient
will die." Relying on lower court decisions7
which included ill health and the possibility
of suicide within the definition of "neces-
4 71 A.C. at -, 458 P.2d at 197, 80 Cal. Rptr.
at 357.
5 See Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451
(1939).
6 See R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 101 (1957);
Means, The Law of New York Concerning Abor-
tion and the Status of the Fetus, 1664-1968: A
Case of Cessation of Constitutionality, 14 N.Y.
L.F. 411 (1968).
7 People v. Abarbanel, 239 Cal. App. 2d 31, 48
Cal. Rptr. 336 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1965); People
v. Ballard, 218 Cal. App. 2d 295, 32 Cal. Rptr.
233 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1963); People v. Ballard,
167 Cal. App. 2d 803, 335 P.2d 204 (Ct. App.
2d Dist. 1959).
sary to preserve life," the court reasoned
that a demonstration of immediacy or cer-
tainty of death was not essential. Moreover,
the court concluded that such a definition
would abridge both a woman's constitu-
tional right to life," and her right to choose
whether to bear children or not.! The exis-
tence of these rights, however, was not in
issue; rather, the critical question before
the court related to "whether the state has
a compelling interest in the regulation of
a subject which is within the police powers
of the state. '"10 Conceding that the instant
definition may have been feasible in the
nineteenth century (when any operation
was dangerous), the court, nevertheless,
decided that in view of modern medical
practice" 1 such a construction could not be
8 The court held that the woman's right to life
was involved because childbirth involves risks of
death. 71 A.C. at -, 458 P.2d at 199, 80 Cal.
Rptr. at 359.
The court also indicated that Dr. Belous'
standing to raise this right was unchallenged. Id.
at -, 458 P.2d at 199 n.5, 80 Cal. Rptr. at
359 n.5. Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965).
" "The fundamental right of the woman to
choose whether to bear children follows from
the Supreme Court's and this court's repeated
acknowledgement of a 'right of privacy' or
'liberty' in matters related to marriage, family,
and sex." 71 A.C. at -, 458 P.2d at 199, 80 Cal.
Rptr. at 359 (1969) (citing Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel.
Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)).
10 71 A.C. at -, 458 P.2d at 200, 80 Cal. Rptr.
at 360.
11 The court placed heavy reliance on reports of
European countries, which maintain that a hos-
pital therapeutic abortion during the first trimes-
ter is safer for a woman than to bear a child.
See Kolblova, Legal Abortion in Czechoslovakia,
justified when it would result in a direct in-
fringement upon such rights. In response
to the contention that the state has a com-
pelling interest in the protection of the un-
born child12 which would warrant the
limitation of a woman's rights,'13 the court
held: first, that statutes recognizing the
rights of an unborn child require a live
birth, 14 or reflect the interest of the par-
ents," and hence, are distinguishable; sec-
ond, that the penal code acknowledges a
distinction between a living child and an
unborn child by its classification of murder
as the destruction of the former, and the
lesser crime of abortion as the destruction
of the latter;"! finally, that the pregnant
woman's right to life takes precedence over
any interest the state may have in the un-
born child."l
196 J.A.M.A. 371 (1966); Mehland, Combating
Illegal Abortion in the Socialist Countries of
Europe, 13 WORLD MED. J. 84 (1966); Tietze &
Lehfeldt, Legal Abortion in Eastern Europe, 175
J.A.M.A. 1149, 1152 (1961).
12 Cf. Noonan, Amendment of the Abortion
Law: Relevant Data and Judicial Opinion, 15
CATH. LAW. 124 (1969).
1"8 See Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial
Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537,
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964), wherein the
court placed this right to life above the mother's
right to free exercise of religion. See also In re
President of Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 331 F.2d
1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 978
(1964).
"4 See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 29 (West 1954);
CAL. PROB. CODE § 250 (West 1956).
15 71 A.C. at -, 458 P.2d at 202, 80 Cal. Rptr.
at 362 (1969) (citing Kyne v. Kyne, 38 Cal.
App. 2d 122, 100 P.2d 806 (Ct. App. 1st Dist.
1940); People v. Sianes, 134 Cal. App. 355, 25
P.2d 487 (Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1933).
16 See R. PERKtNS, CRIMINAL LAW 103 (1957).
17 71 A.C. at -, 458 P.2d at 202-03, 80 Cal.
Rptr. at 362-63 (1969).
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Continuing its analysis, the court found
that the addition of the words "substan-
tially" or "reasonably" necessary to pre-
serve life actually led to more confusion
since these words were relative and subjec-
tive when used in this context. That is, an
application of these words to particular
circumstances demonstrates that given indi-
viduals might consider an abortion neces-
sary when the risk of death is merely
increased, or when the risk of death is
doubled, or not until the risk of death
becomes an absolute certainty. The only
construction which the court considered
feasible was that the legislature may have
intended a relative safety test whereby an
abortion would be permissible if the risk
of death due to abortion was less than the
risk of death in childbirth. However, the
court found that neither the statute nor any
decisions interpreting the statute suggested
such a test. In further support of its con-
clusion the court focused upon the difficul-
ties confronting the doctor who is called
upon to decide whether an abortion is per-
missible. In view of the severe penalties
attending such a decision, a doctor might
be reluctant to approve of a justifiable
abortion and, ultimately, a woman's rights
would bear the loss.1 8
In summary, the decision has two iden-
tifiable facets. First, that the meanings
drawn from ordinary usage, previous judi-
cial interpretations, and the common law
do not provide the degree of certainty re-
18 The court held that the delegation of decision-
making power to a directly involved individual
violates the fourteenth amendment. Id. at -,
458 P.2d at 206, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 366. Cf. Tumey
v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
PEOPLE V. BELOUS
quired when criminal sanctions are in-
volved; nor do the words "substantially" or
"reasonably," which are often employed to
clarify a statute, provide any assistance.
Secondly, the state's definition cannot be
adopted because its interest in regulating
abortion is subordinate to the woman's
constitutional right to life and to choose
whether to bear children or not.
The dissenting opinions of Justices Burke
and Sullivan questioned the majority's hold-
ing, contending that the phrase under consid-
eration had been accorded its common-
sense meaning by doctors, judges, lawyers
and juries for over one hundred years.
Furthermore, the dissenters reasoned that
the construction previously given the statute
was in accord with the legislature's intent
that the rights of the unborn child to life
should be sacrificed only if there were a
danger to the life of the mother.
The State's Petition for Rehearing
The petition challenging the decision in
the Belous case reiterated the conflict of
rights and interests of the mother and an
unborn child. Indeed, the petition ques-
tioned the court's assumption that a woman
has the right to decide whether or not to
bear children. Although the woman's deci-
sion as to whether to conceive may be con-
stitutionally protected, the petitioner denied
the existence of any right to choose once
conception occurs. 19 Thus, it was argued
that the state's interest in protecting the
unborn child is paramount except where
19 Statement in support of Petition for Rehear-
ing at 2, People v. Belous, 71 A.C. 996, 458
P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969).
the mother's life is endangered. The peti-
tioner contended that abortion was orig-
inally proscribed, absent the most com-
pelling circumstances, not because of the
dangers involved in the operative process
(which petitioner maintained still exist),
but in recognition of the human life which
must be protected from the moment of
conception. This position is supported by
the contention that if the dangers surround-
ing an operation were the sole consider-
ation, the legislature would not have also
proscribed the administration of any med-
icine, drug, or substance to procure a mis-
carriage. "0
The petition also challenged the propri-
ety of permitting three lower court decisions
to obscure, rather than clarify, a statute
and ultimately lead to its invalidation.2'
In reply to the court's position that a phy-
sician will seek to avoid the risk of pros-
ecution by being reluctant to authorize an
abortion, the petitioner asserted that the
risk of civil or criminal liability is inherent
in every decision to perform surgery, and,
therefore, should not be given extraordi-
nary weight.
Other States Follow the Lead
In Doe v. Lefkowitz,22 a suit recently ini-
tiated in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York, the
20) Id. at 2-3.
21, Cases cited note 7 supra.
22 69 Civil No. 4423 (S.D.N.Y., filed Sept. 30,
1969). As of this writing the plaintiffs had ,uc-
cessfully obtained a three-judge consideration of
the case, and had withstood challenges based
on lack of standing. 6 CR. L. 2132 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 4, 1969).
parties sought a declaratory judgment and
permanent injunction against the enforce-
ment of New York's abortion laws. The
organizations initiating the action were ad-
mittedly influenced by the Belous decisions
and have announced that suits are also
planned in 38 other states with abortion
laws similar to those of New York and
California..2'
The complaint in Doe alleged that the
law under attack was unconstitutional be-
cause it violated:
(1) the right of a physician and patient
to privacy in their associations,
(2) the right of the physician to care for
his patients according to the highest
standards of modern medical practice,
(3) the right of a pregnant woman to
decide whether to risk the dangers of
childbirth,
(4) the right of a woman not to be com-
pelled to bear a child each time she
conceives,
(5) the right of women to safe and ad-
equate medical advice and treatment
pertaining to the decision of whether
to carry a given pregnancy to term,
and
(6) the right of couples not to be forced
to become parents following each and
every conception.2 4
Further Developments
Agreeing with the due process objections
expressed in Belous, the District Court of
the District of Columbia recently reached
a similar conclusion in United States v.
2. 162 N.Y.L.J. 65, Oct. 1, 1969, at 1, col. 6.
24 Id. at 4, col. 6.
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Vuitch.2 5 As in Belous, the lack of cer-
tainty, i.e., the failure of the statute20 to
proscribe specific standards of conduct, and
the presence of constitutionally protected
individual rights which could conceivably
be infringed under the statute, was the
motivation for the decision that the statute
was unconstitutional as applied to physi-
cians. However, that portion of the statute
which prohibited abortions by nonphysi-
cians was declared to be constitutional as
a legitimate exercise of Congress' police
power. It should be noted that an immedi-
ate distinction between Belous and Vuitch
is that the decision in the latter removed
all obstacles to abortion by a physician,
whereas Belous did not affect the recent
amendments to the California Code.
Conclusion
Prior to the Vuitch decision, it was con-
ceivable that a reevaluation by the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court of its decision in
Belous would discourage many of the suits
presently planned in other states. Notwith-
standing the refusal of the California court
to reverse its decision, it is feasible that
the Belous case can be limited because of
its peculiar facts. That is, since the court
was aware of a changing legislative attitude
towards abortion as manifested by amend-
ments to the law, and the concomitant fac-
tor that the invalidation of the older statute
would not create havoc in the long run in
view of those amendments, the court may
have adopted an attitude more liberal than
the situation demanded. However, the exis-
25 38 L.W. 1074 (D.D.C. Nov. 10, 1969).
26 D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-201 (1967).
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tence of factors completely contrary in
Vuitch did not preclude the court from
finding as it did; consequently, there is no
law governing abortion by a physician in
Washington, D.C. As a result, it is difficult
to estimate the impact that Belous will
eventually have on the abortion laws of
other states in view of the momentum
gained by pro-abortionists from the Vuitch
decision. Further developments will be
treated in future editions of THE CATH-
OLIC LAWYER.
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